Combating America’s Default Atheism and Worship of a Tribal Deity with William Desmond

Sixty years ago, Time Magazine captured the ethos of the day in raising the question on its cover, “Is God Dead?” Among a certain segment of society, represented by such figures as Thomas Altizer and William Hamilton, the cry of Friedrich Nietzsche’s madman (“God is dead”), expressed the felt need to carry on the work of theology and philosophy without God. It was a time in the United States when secularism captured the mass imagination, in a sensibility William Desmond dubs “default atheism.” In default atheism there are atheistic presumptions that may or may not be fully conscious. While the new atheists gained a popular hearing, there has also been a shift toward religion in politics and in the public imagination, which might be characterized as a “default religion” which unwittingly takes up atheistic assumptions. God’s existence is not the issue, but his moral character reflected in Christ, tied to the ground of being. If the Hebrew Scriptures depict the contention between belief in a tribal God (one who commits genocide, killing the inhabitants of the land to make way for “his chosen people”) and a God who is good, we might have thought the issue was resolved in the Christian picture of the Father of Christ. The God revealed in Christ is universal, the very ground of being as overflowing goodness. Where God is too small, there is a metaphysical disconnect between God, the world, and human interiority, and this disconnect can function as a practical atheism. The question is, if something more insidious than atheism is now at work, perhaps a “default” notion of God more nihilistic in its outcomes than atheism?

Statistically there has not been much of a shift, but in a time when Christians seem to be supporting harsh immigration policies, open racism, and genocide in Gaza (in supporting the present administration) one might expect that there would be a mass moral outcry against detaining migrants in torturous crowded conditions, depriving them of medical care and disappearing them to other countries or within the prison archipelago, arresting children and separating them from their parents, killing women, children, and civilians in Iran and Gaza, and killing U.S. citizens in the streets. One might expect that an administration populated by devout Christians, would have within it a moral counter voice to the draconian policies.

The present administration is made up largely of devout Christians with J. D. Vance (Vice President), Marco Rubio (Secretary of State) Sean Duffy (Transportation Secretary) John Ratcliffe (CIA Director), Linda McMahon (Education Secretary), and Elise Stefanik (UN Ambassador) all devout Catholics. Jonathan Heaps notes in this mornings Commonweal Magazine, that the administration has added one of the nation’s most prominent Catholic intellectuals, Chad Pecknold of Catholic University of America, to serve as Principal Director for Cultural Outreach at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Pecknold is to be the voice of administrations policies, working in Homeland Security’s Office of Public Engagement. He will provide explanation for the policies implemented under former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Kristi Noem (now head of The Shield of the Americas) and her replacement Markwayne Mullin (both devout Pentecostals). Rather than a moral counter voice, these prominent Christians are literally the voice promoting the worst cruelties of this administration. Heaps points out that Pecknold, as a professor of CUA is under the authority of the church (serving on “a pontifical faculty accredited by the Holy See.”). As such, he “has been hired to continue to publicly promote the administration’s hyper-hawkish immigration aims, to continue to say things like ‘mass deportations may be a legitimate response to mass migration’” as he has argued in a policy paper.[1] It seems Pecknold will be in charge of justifying the “disappearing” and torture of immigrants and the “de-legalizing more than a million Black and brown refugees.” 

Pecknold is joining a strong lineup of deeply pious Protestant Christians such as Mike Huckabee (Ambassador to Israel and a Baptist Preacher), who stated in an interview that it would be “fine” if Israel took the land stretching from the Nile River to the Euphrates River (the “Greater Israel” promised in the Bible), which would include the eastern parts of Egypt, western and central parts of Iraq, all of Syria, all of Jordan, all of Lebanon, the northern part of Saudi Arabia, and of course all of Palestine the West Bank and Gaza. Huckabee has recently come out condemning Israeli settlers’ treatment of Palestinians, but as U.S. Ambassador he has supported the right to occupy these lands. He has carried out U.S. policy in support of Israel, and the genocidal actions of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

We could go on to describe the piety of Russell Vought (Director of the Office of Management and Budget), who has weaponized Trump’s policies against States resistant to his powers (as an outspoken evangelical), or the deep religiosity of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who has implemented a policy of “maximum lethality” in bombing Iran, in extra-judicial killings of occupants of boats on the Caribbean, and in ignoring international law in warfare, recklessly killing civilians. We could point to Trump’s own religious concerns in his appointment of Paula White-Cain who serves as a senior advisor leading the White House Faith Office, acting as primary spiritual advisor to the President. Trump’s spirituality may be the most marked characteristic of the pervading religious sensibility. His religion is indistinguishable from nihilism, and though Jesus and God and prayer provide window dressing, any serious notion of God, of Christian ethics, of human compassion or empathy, or of any resistance to secularism or atheism are indiscernible. Trump embodies a religion that has succeeded in emptying the world of Christian social concern. He probably could not articulate the world which foregrounds and determines his actions, but it is clearly lacking in serious recognition of the Father of Christ or of a Christian ground of being. 

The point is obvious, that the Christian religion, as understood and practiced by this administration, and perhaps the religion which garnered the vote to put this administration in office, is more insidious than atheism, in that it worships a God who either allows for or justifies evil. The practical atheism and nihilism of this faith is covered by a veneer of Christianity, but the default atheism of one generation now pervades and foregrounds the religion of this generation. This God is less intellectually viable than the non-existent God of atheism, more of a primitive tribal God, disconnected from the ontological ground of goodness fused to the world in Christ. Whether default atheism and secularism are responsible, or simply a malformed Christianity or both, it is obvious that the God behind America’s religious nationalism and popular ethos lacks the basic qualifications for serious belief.

Godlessness may have so bewitched a generation, that serious consideration of God among philosophers and even theologians, to say nothing of the popular imagination, now seems to elude the Christian majority. It is a fairly simple exercise to pose the moral teaching of Christ against the morality of this religion. Nonviolence, welcoming the stranger, God as love, taking up the cross, forsaking selfish egoism, abandoning greed, giving to the poor, forgiveness, the universal value of all God’s creation and all people, is the entry point into Christianity 101. This moral teaching of Christ and the New Testament does not enter into the cruel ethos promoted by this administration and its supporters. Finite purposes, immediate selfish needs, greed, patriotism, white nationalism, Zionism, racism, all serve the immanent realm and the religion either does not interfere or is made to support this closed moral consideration enchained by worldly concerns (a failed metaphysics and morality). What seems to have been lost with moral seriousness, is a seriousness about God, such that default atheism and default religion occupy the same space. It may be that the popular religion has simply inherited the presumptions of atheism, presuming either that God is totally immanent (identical with the world), or so transcendent so as to be unknowable and unknown or at least not interfering with the world (deism). Transcendence removed from immanence, or an immanence without transcendence, function equally well to preserve presumptions of human autonomy. No God, a non-interfering God, or the world as God, serve the same practices, but perhaps more to the point, none of these systems presume to penetrate beneath the world foregrounding practice.

There is a closure within the self, in Charles Taylor’s description. Religious and non-religious inhabit the same “immanent frame,” existing as “buffered subjects” having closed off the boundary between inside (thought) and outside (nature, the physical), living in a disenchanted world. “Living in a disenchanted world, the buffered self is no longer open, vulnerable to a world of spirits and forces which cross the boundaries of the mind, indeed, negate the very idea of there being a secure boundary . . .”[2] The immanent frame is a practical atheism, excluding the interpenetration of the world and human interiority from realization of the divine.

William Desmond, imagines that we can break out of the immanent frame which binds by a reworked metaphysical recognition. He counters this lost porosity with the idea that there should be a concerted effort to realize the porosity of being, to recognize there is an intersection with the divine in the immanent. To unblock the boundaries clogging porosity, he calls upon a philosophical and theological acknowledgement of being saturated, a “too muchness.” “The very identity of philosophy might itself have to be called into question — an identity to be reformulated perhaps in terms of a porosity of thinking to what exceeds its determination purely through thought’s own immanent resources.”[3] The signs of transcendence intersecting with immanence are in an over determinate being (the idiocy or givenness of the world), in the aesthetics or beauty of the world, in the very nature of human desire or erotics and in, what Desmond calls, an agapeic outpouring. He describes breaching the walls of default atheism through recognition that human existence is between the transcendent and immanent: “Within the between there are hyperboles of being which communicate more than the terms of immanence can circumscribe: pointers to ultimate transcendence as Other to the immanent between.”[4] He describes these hyperboles as throwing us above, pointing both beyond ourselves and the immediate world. In Christian terms, there is an intersection, in Christ, between the immanent and transcendent, which points to the metaphysical reality we inhabit. Desmond’s resolution to default atheism addresses the failures of a default religion with very similar presumptions.

First, there is givenness (an “idiocy of being”), the wonder that there is something rather than nothing. With Pascal, we realize that we exist between an infinite something and an absolute nothing hidden from man:

A nothing compared to the infinite, a whole compared to the nothing, a middle point between all and nothing, infinitely remote from an understanding of the extremes; the end of things and their principles are unattainably hidden from him in impenetrable secrecy. Equally incapable of seeing the nothing from which he emerges and the infinity in which he is engulfed. What else can he do, then, but perceive some semblance of the middle of things, eternally hopeless of knowing either their principles or their end? All things come out of nothingness and are carried onwards to infinity. Who can follow these astonishing processes? The author of these wonders understands them no one else can.[5]

The wonder of existence described by Pascal was once readily available, but default religion systematically reduces everything, so as to rid us of being either frightened or exhilarated (enchanted) by the darkness or the light. “Man is a double being, and yet in him the extremities can touch each other. It is as if the extremities flash across the interim between and find their point of intensive condensation in us. There is nothing middling or mediocre about our being between.”[6] The Pascalian realization however, points to the existential divide which will soon follow, in which human interiority is a world closed within itself. Friedrich Nietzsche considered Pascal the only logical Christian, and is one of his heirs. At least Nietzsche’s atheism retained some of the possible wonder, but modern scientism and secularism would reduce all to a grey sameness. Pascal has hit upon the wonder of being, a metaphysical astonishment beyond finite determinations, which for Pascal, as a Christian, pointed directly to God.

Second, is the hyperbole of aesthetics: “The incarnate glory of aesthetic happening rouses astonishment and appreciation before finite being yet seems to exceed finitization.”[7] The world speaks of the glory of God, in excess of its finite possibilities, on the order of a great work of art. “The beauty of creation: integral being lovely for self, splendid immanence as a whole, yet not a closed but rather an open whole. The sublimity of creation: the beyond of aesthetic finitude shattering finitude in finitude and elevating it above itself.”[8] There is an over determinacy in divine goodness showing forth in the shining glory of the world. As the Psalmist declares, “The heavens are telling of the glory of God; and their expanse is declaring the work of His hands. Day to day pours forth speech, and night to night reveals knowledge” (Ps 19:1-2). “This cannot be just another finite intelligibility, since this is in question, but rather we are pointed to an intelligibility hyperbolic to finite intelligibility. The intelligibility that allows us to render the finite intelligible is not itself intelligible in fully finitizable terms.”[9] It is not just a matter of intelligent design, but what is beyond and provides for intelligence and the rational. “We are awakened to something inexhaustible about the good of being at all. There is something too much about this for us. We are secretly sustained by it, but being so intimate with it, participating in it, we cannot get a fix on it.”[10] Aesthetics (as well as ethics) is a call to a deeper, transcendent being, in the goodness of creation.

Third, there is the hyperbole of “erotics” in which human passion draws us toward the world and toward others, which witnesses to a deep porosity or relatedness, natural and integral to being human. “Indeed, the passion of our being (passio essendi) points to something deeper than just self- surpassing, since it witnesses to a more primal porosity to what exceeds us.”[11] Human passion and erotics continually pull us beyond the self as part of the self: “the erotics of human selving makes us a living incarnation of an aporia of finitude: a living impasse in finite being that cannot pass beyond itself as impasse through its own power alone, even when it seems to surpass itself infinitely.”[12] There is pleasure, delight, or an aesthetic potency made manifest in passion, in recognition or realization of the good. We experience this bodily, but this bodily satisfaction is not simply physical, but points to an ontological depth, the pure goodness of being. This goodness does not by-pass the senses, but in the biblical understanding, this truth is received through the senses. As in the Song of Solomon, the flame of Yahweh is burning in the erotic, directly joined to enjoyment of the divine. 

Fourth, in our relational identity, is the hyperbole of agapeics of community. “There is an ecstasis from fullness giving itself as well as from lack seeking itself in fullness, our being is in receiving and in giving. We are at all, in a primal ontological sense, by receiving our’ ‘to be’, by being received into being at all.”[13] This fourth way intersects with Desmond’s grounding notion of the metaxological or the between, in that this is the grounding reality of the the gift, of receiving ourselves. “There is a sign of this in the ontological situation of our finitude itself: we are given to be before we can give ourselves to be; finitude as such is given, but not given from itself alone.”[14] It puts the stress, not on self-mediation, but the mediation through a community beyond the self, beyond univocal sameness and even beyond dialectics. As he says, “It puts the emphasis on an intermediation, not a self-mediation, however dialectically qualified.”[15] This inter opens the space for God, for community, for otherness, and plurality, simultaneously showing forth the truth in the univocal, the equivocal and the dialectical, but setting these ways in a larger context (the metaxological). As Desmond concludes, “These hyperboles, and most ultimately the hyperbole of agapeic being, offer us the richest senses of the ‘to be’ in finitude that also speak of the ‘too muchness’, the overdeterminacy of being in which we participate in the between. Properly understood, they communicate signs of the overdeterminacy of God.”[16]

This overdeterminancy, I take to be the sign and message of Christ, who brings together the divine and human. While Desmond is working primarily in a philosophical register, with the aim of bringing philosophy alongside theology, perhaps this one step back from theology, in philosophy, provides the necessary interval to recognizing the overflowing goodness of God. On the other hand, his project rests upon his Christian faith, which does not always serve to overtly ground his description. This is not necessarily a defect, but apart from this open recognition, it could be presumed (which is definitely not his presumption) that philosophy, observation, metaphysics, are adequate, apart from recognition that ultimate insight flows from a Christian center. Where this connection is not made (e.g., Nietzsche reading Pascal), one wonders if his descriptions might be reversed. One could restate his project in the negative, and describe how it is that being caught between something and nothing can drain beauty, desire, and love out of the world, in a crushing nihilism. This is the existential possibility that Pascal introduces, which Nietzsche develops, and which a default atheism presumes.

It seems it is this existential nihilism, the crack unfilled by a metaxological spirituality, that has a grip on American Christianity. With Slavoj Žižek, we might focus on the dis-ease of the discord and assume it points to a final lack, or with Desmond, we might see the gap as a “godsend” which points to the overflow of reality, but it is the same crack (letting in the darkness and the light) opened in the modern frame. In the “crack” there is a mystery which speaks of excess, which the theologian recognizes as Logos. The God/man certainly makes a moral demand, but this moral demand is grounded in the intersection of time and eternity, immanence and transcendence, heaven and earth, and divine and human in His person – he opens up the metaxological reality Desmond describes. Christ relieves us of the Big Other of the transgressive law, the crushing transcendence, whether in the form of Nietzschean atheism or a demonic theism. Desmond, in spite of his reticence, is a key aid in extrapolating from Christ, to break down the suffocating walls of default atheism, the immanent frame, which has captured the American religious ethos.


[1] Jonathan Heaps, “Chad Pecknold’s New Job” in Commonweal (September 15, 2026).

[2] Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 300-301

[3] William Desmond, “On God and the Between, in Between philosophy and Theolog:Ccontemporary Interpretations of Christianity (Routledge, 2019),101.

[4] On God and the Between, 118.

[5] Blaise Pascal, Pensées, translated with an introduction by A.J. Krailsheimer (Baltimore: Penguin, 1966), 90. Cited in On God and the Between, 110.

[6] On God and the Between, 110.

[7] On God and the Between, 120.

[8] On God and the Between, 120.

[9] On God and the Between, 120.

[10] William Desmond, Ethics and the Between (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001) 66. Chapter 6 is entitled “Potencies of the Ethical: On the Sources of Being Good.”

[11] On God and the Between, 120.

[12] On God and the Between, 121.

[13] On God and the Between, 121.

[14] On God and the Between, 121.

[15] William Desmond, “The Fourfold Way” in The William Desmond Reader (State University of New York Press, Kindle Edition) location 295.

[16] On God and the Between, 121.

William Desmond’s Completion of Hegel

As a boy in Texas, unattenuated perhaps to the age, the world around me came alive with divine grandeur, discovered through my new-found faith. At the time it seemed obvious that I could ride off into the prairie and meet God, who showed himself in the meadowlark, the killdeer, the quail, the rabbits, the ever-present coyote. It was a stark landscape and yet the patches of life, the cottonwoods, occasional streams, the striking sunrise and sunset, seemed to show the face of God. What was once a regular occurrence and always in easy reach, faded with time, education, and perhaps attunement to the age. How is it that the world as saturated with the grandeur of God, once the common understanding, can be renewed?

As Charles Taylor has demonstrated in A Secular Age, the world has changed from one in which it was “virtually impossible not to believe in God in, say, 1500 in our Western society,” to one in which “many of us find this not only easy, but even inescapable?”[1] Taylor describes the closing in of the world into an “immanent frame” in which this world in its finitude is determinant of value, and there is a closing in upon the self, what Taylor calls the “buffered” self. Our age has been captured by the “punctual” or “atomistic” sense of self, cut off from history and only vaguely aware of any alternative culture, so that the framework shaping life is perceived as the singular possibility. “So the buffered identity of the disciplined individual moves in a constructed social space, where instrumental rationality is a key value, and time is pervasively secular. All of this makes up what I want to call ‘the immanent frame’.”[2] The irony is that the original effort, producing the secular, was to protect God from being contaminated with finiteness or materiality. It “was an achievement of Latin Christendom in the late Middle Ages and early modern period . . . made in order to mark clearly the autonomy of the super natural.”[3] Taylor spends much of his book describing how this immanent frame has come to dominate modern life: “Modern science, along with the many other facets described—the buffered identity, with its disciplines, modern individualism, with its reliance on instrumental reason and action in secular time—make up the immanent frame.”[4]

“God is dead,” not just philosophically or religiously, but in the sense of no longer being an obvious possibility. “From within the picture, it just seems obvious that the order of argument proceeds from science to atheism, through a series of well-grounded steps.”[5] There has been a subtraction or loss of concern for God or the transcendent, and “what we’re left with is human good, and that is what modern societies are concerned with.”[6] Human welfare in general is not the goal, nor is human freedom in general my goal. “Just being confined to human goods could just as well find expression in my concerning myself exclusively with my own material welfare, or that of my family or immediate milieu.”[7]

Even where belief endures the values that prevail in the Christian faith are often those of immanence and there has been a secularization or flattening out of faith, as transcendence has been eclipsed. God has been evacuated from public and social spheres and religion relegated to a private realm. Religious belief and practice are a realm apart from the practical political necessities of utilitarianism. Perhaps, worse than unbelief is a belief in God, confounded with the secular state and secular religion (e.g., Christian nationalism). It is as if “our actions, goals, achievements, and the like, have a lack of weight, gravity, thickness, substance. There is a deeper resonance which they lack, which we feel should be there.”[8] Ours is a world no longer enchanted with the divine.

Taylor calls for a new itinerary or a new path which will move beyond the dead-end of this secular age. “One could say that we look for new and unprecedented itineraries. Understanding our time in Christian terms is partly to discern these new paths, opened by pioneers who have discovered a way through the particular labyrinthine landscape we live in, its thickets and trackless wastes, to God.”[9]

This renewal begun by William Desmond, begins with a return to Hegel, who founds his philosophy on the createdness of the world. He presumes faith in the Creator is the proper frame in which to understand the world: “If someone were to make his profession of faith as follows: ‘I believe in God the Father, the Creator of heaven and earth’, it would be surprising if someone else were to conclude from this first part that the person professing his faith believed in God, the creator of heaven, and therefore considered the earth to be uncreated and matter to be eternal.”[10] Hegel was criticized for equating the “actual” and the “rational,” but he explains that he simply intends what the Christian religion is founded upon: God is the mind behind the world, and we encounter God in thinking this out. “With regard to their philosophical meaning, however, we may presuppose that the reader is sufficiently educated to know not only that God is actual– that he is what is most actual, indeed that he alone is what is truly actual, but also, insofar as the merely formal difference is concerned, that existence in general is partly appearance and only partly actuality.”[11] God cannot be equated with the appearance, but he is the personal actuality behind the appearance encountered in thought.

Hegel recognizes that the world is apprehended by persons, in thought, created as it is by a personal God. “They must be involved in it, whether through their external senses only or with their deeper spirit and the essential consciousness of their respective self. This is the same principle that in our time has been called faith, immediate knowledge, the revelation coming from outside and in particular from one’s own inner being.”[12] To imagine, with Newton, that everything is reducible to rule, to principles, or to abstractions, is to miss that these too are thought. “But what in essence they aim at and produce are laws, general propositions, a theory, i.e. the thoughts of what there is.”[13] Empirical knowledge or scientific laws are part of human experience and thought, marked by “freedom, spirit, and God.” To separate empirical laws from thought and experience is to lose the reality undergirding them. “The reason why they cannot be found in that sphere is not that they are supposedly not a part of experience; they are not experienced by way of the senses, it is true, but whatever is present in consciousness is being experienced– this is even a tautological sentence. Rather, they are not found in that sphere, because in terms of their content these objects immediately present themselves as infinite.”[14] This is part of recognizing the personhood on both sides of thought, not in the manner of Descartes – though an understanding toward which he gestured, that the person is involved in what he knows.

Hegel is also critical of the metaphysical tradition which would understand the world as an object or objectivity existing over and against the thinking subject. Traditional ontology focused on the world as a substance, which could be potentially endowed with thought, but nonetheless the thinking subject still viewed the world as a separate object: “something other than itself that is not a self for itself and therefore still separated from the contemplating subject.”[15] Hegel saw his work as bringing to completion the Kantian turn to the subject, but he expands upon this subjectivity and thinking, as “the world is, at its core, subjectivity itself. For this reason, substance had to be shown to be subject, too, and substance ontology had to be seen ultimately to be subject ontology.”[16] One need not approach the subject on the basis of the philosophical arguments for God, as if one needed to prove God before setting out in belief and thinking. This would be like needing to comprehend the digestion system before eating, or learning to swim before getting in the water. The content of philosophy is thought and this thought is engagement with the spirit “the living spirit, a content turned into a world, namely the outer and inner world of consciousness, or that its content is actuality.”[17]  

This sets up a very different relationship between the finite and infinite. For Descartes the finite, inclusive of the body and the world of finite physical things, must disappear in thinking being. Where Descartes thinks away the world in his grasp for infinite being, Hegel presumes there is an encounter with the infinite only as being first proves to be finite. As Stephen Houlgate explains, for Descartes “not only does the infinite precede the idea of the finite in our minds but infinite being itself precedes and transcends finite being in reality.”[18] According to Descartes, and here much of the western philosophical and theological tradition concurs, God may create and sustain but this is secondary and subsequent to his existence apart from finite things. For Hegel the infinite and the finite are inseparable, and to separate them is to limit both. The infinite must include the finite or it is a bad infinite or not a true infinite. The determinant or concrete is not a limit for the infinite, as each implies the other and each turns into the other.

Hegel, Taylor, and Desmond, have a deep appreciation for the power of thought, to either delude or liberate. Thought has the capacity to locate and evaluate itself, but it is also easily lost in the age. Taylor traces how the power of persons to evaluate where they are, how they got here, and how things can change, has been captured by a utilitarianism which limits options to what principle will work. This is also the point of Hegel’s logic, namely that thought cannot merely be reduced to the useful: “insofar as the logical dimension constitutes the absolute form of the truth and even more than that, the pure truth itself, it is something completely different from anything merely useful.”[19] There is an inherent value in thought, as coming to the truth is the point. “Truth is a grand word and an even grander thing. If someone’s spirit and mind are still healthy, his heart must leap at once at the thought of this word.”[20]

There is a seeming “incommensurateness” between thought and truth, raising the question whether or not we can know God. “God is the truth; how are we to know him?” This is not a time for false humility. “Such language as ‘How am I, a poor earthly worm, to know the truth?’ is a thing of the past.”[21] Hegel notes, this is Pilate’s question, which (after Christ) is a thing of the past. Christ commands worship in spirit and truth, and Hegel is explicating this goal: “Only in thinking and as thinking is this content, God himself, in its truth. In this sense, then, thought is not just mere thought, but rather the highest and, properly viewed, the only manner in which it is possible to comprehend what is eternal and in and for itself.”[22]

This explains the departure of Desmond, who has been called the last metaphysician,[23] as he unrepentantly takes up the issue of being, but he sidesteps the postmodern critique of metaphysics in his reworking of Hegel. He adapts the Hegelian dialectic, keeping equivocity (difference) and univocity (sameness) alive, which he characterizes as “a process of interplay between same and different, between self and other.”[24] The focus is on dialogue as “mindful communication” between persons, as opposed to impersonal arrival at theory. Dialogue entails an openness to others, and a dynamic unfolding involving “a rhythmic process of unfolding, whether of process or events, thoughtful articulations or communications.”[25]

Desmond dubs his approach “metaxology” which attempts “to think beyond an oscillation back and forth between univocity and equivocity, while facing both of these fair and square.”[26] In the dialectic exchange there is a certain perceived lack, which moves the conversation forward. According to Ryan Duns, “Metaxology neither supplants nor annuls these voices but hold together to allow each to speak of being. Metaxology symphonically weaves together each voice and allows it to speak its truth yet balances these voices so no one dominates the other.”[27] Like Hegel, Desmond understands his work to lead to the “practice of a kind of thinking” which is mindful of the multiple voices at play within being.[28] Of course, Hegel is the focus of much of his critique, but it is from the advances of Hegel and his interactions with Hegel, that his philosophy of the metaxological takes shape.

The metaxological builds upon Hegel’s notion that infinite being is in-finite (or non finite) being that can only be understood on the basis of the finite. This turns the presumption of Descartes on its head and with him much of the ontotheological project. Descartes assumes that infinite being is that purely positive being, grasped in his cogito (“I think therefore I am”), which is the necessary beginning point which must be comprehended prior to knowledge of the finite, but for Hegel and Desmond being first proves to be finite and it is only on this basis that it also proves to be infinite. It is not that our faculty of reason arrives at God through its own power, but the infinite is given in the finite, first and foremost in human subjectivity. This is the truth Desmond builds upon and refines, as in his understanding the transcendent shows itself in the world. Where in a Cartesian modernism the infinite is gained by abstracting ourselves out of the world, Desmond’s philosophy presumes and shows how the Transcendent or Infinite is available in and through the finite.

While this was once the prevailing notion and sensibility (that the world is filled with the glory of God), the Cartesian divide served to disenchant the world, reducing it to a mechanism, no longer serving as a door to the infinite. Ryan Duns argues that Desmond has taken up Taylor’s challenge to forge a new path toward God. It is not simply that Desmond begins again, but he is a careful reader of Hegel, such that his work might be characterized (perhaps not the way he would characterize it) as a revamping and reworking of Hegel. As Duns notes, “By inquiring into the truth and limits of dialectic, Desmond exposes the nearly-imperceptible cracks in Hegel’s philosophy, exposing openings in the Hegelian system capable of leading us toward a renewal of metaphysical thought.”[29] This is not a return to an abstract metaphysics but is a path of spiritual renewal through a reawakened wonder which Duns compares to a pilgrimage. The secular age poses an obstacle to God which requires effort and practice to overcome.

The question of what to do, or even what would Jesus do, misses that the primary question should be what one desires to be. The focus, in Taylor’s terms (taken up by Duns), has been “corralled” by questions of “what we ought to do” without addressing “questions about what it is good to be or what it is good to love.”[30] The ethical issue is not to live up to a code but to enter into a relationship. Taylor contrasts an apodictic reasoning, set upon some code, to an ad hominem reasoning, which takes account of love in dialogue. As Duns explains (in applying Taylor to Desmond), “By ad hominem he means an argument that goes “to the person” and assumes the interlocutor’s point of view. Essentially, ad hominem argument begins from another’s standpoint and, by means of dialogue, shows how adopting another position might prove beneficial. Rather than trying to find neutral ground or territory, it seeks to engage the subjectivity of one’s interlocutor.”[31]  Duns likens it to the practice of prayer: “In its commitment to abiding within the flux and ambiguity of existence and giving ear to the call of voices suppressed in other philosophical practices, metaxology affects a stance of ongoing vigilance, open and attentive to the call of the other. Metaxology, so framed, becomes akin to a form of philosophical prayer listening for and willing to respond to the call of the Other.”[32] The practice of metaxology means dwelling between sameness and difference, not through a final synthesis, but by “recurrence to the rich ambiguities of the middle.”[33] Desmond pictures Hegel as privileging a self-mediation which would reduce or encompass the Other in the same, but he advocates a continual inter-mediation focused on what is other to the self. Genuine philosophical thinking “must be both self-mediating and also open to the intermediation between thought and what is other to thought, precisely as other.”[34]

There is a convergence of Hegel and Desmond on human experience. The point is not absolute certainty, as in a traditional metaphysics or philosophical argument, but building upon experience and openness to dialogue. Where Descartes, like Anselm before him, begins with absolute certainty, presuming that he has grasped the infinite, the presumption of Desmond’s “dialogue” is that closure is impossible. “It is a biographical argument, one that offers a new form of life, that initiates an ongoing process of growth in articulacy as one approaches asymptotically the goal of human flourishing.”[35] Duns claims that Desmond’s metaxology redeems the promise of Hegel’s dialectic. “Whereas Hegel’s dialectic suppressed equivocity, metaxology recuperates equivocity and balances it with univocity.”[36]


[1] Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 25

[2] Taylor, 542.

[3] Taylor, 542.

[4] Taylor, 566.

[5] Taylor, 565.

[6] Taylor, 572.

[7] Taylor, 572.

[8] Taylor, 307.

[9] Taylor, 755.

[10] G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline Part I: Science of Logic, Edited and translated by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 [1817]), 11.

[11] Logic, 33.

[12] Logic, 35.

[13] Logic, 35.

[14] Logic, 36.

[15] Logic, xiv.

[16] Logic, xv.

[17] Logic, 33.

[18] Stephen Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006) 401.

[19] Logic, 48.

[20] Logic, 48.

[21] Logic, 48.

[22] Logic, 49.

[23]  John Manoussakis writes, “William Desmond is arguably in our times the last metaphysician.”, “The Silences of the Between,” in William Desmond and Contemporary Theology 269. Cited in Ryan Gerard Duns, Spiritual Exercises for a Secular Age? William Desmond’s Theological Achievement (Boston College PhD, 2018) 79.

[24] William Desmond, The Intimate Universal: The Hidden Porosity among Religion, Art, Philosophy, and Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016) 421. Cited in Duns, 122.

[25] Ibid.

[26] William Desmond, The Intimate Strangeness of Being: Metaphysics After Dialectic (Washington DC: CUA Press, 2012), 55. Cited in Duns, 134.

[27] Duns, 133-134.

[28] The Intimate Universal, 423 and Duns, 134.

[29] Duns, 124.

[30] Duns, 33-34.

[31] See Duns explanation, 25-26.

[32] Duns, 133.

[33] Duns, 132.

[34] William Desmond, Philosophy and Its Others: Ways of being and Mind ( Albany: SUNY 1990) 5. Cited in Duns, 132.

[35] Duns, 30.

[36] Duns, 131