What distinguishes humans from other creatures is a capacity for thought, for a self-aware and world-embracing thought. According to G.W.F. Hegel, this is because the core or ground of reality is in thinking or reason, which he equates with God or spirit.[1] Knowing God, or conceptualizing reality is a participation in that reality, as basic reality is thought. Contrary to the usual portrayal, Hegel aims to regain an orthodox Christian philosophy, and to displace the semi-agnostic musings grounded in Enlightenment faith: “The faith in that would-be philosophical sense is itself nothing but the dry abstractum of immediate knowing, a completely formal determination, not to be confused with or mistaken for the spiritual fullness of the Christian faith, either from the side of the believing heart and the Holy Spirit dwelling within it or from the side of a doctrine abounding in content.”[2] He wants to return to the concrete reality of God known in Christ, and trace how this knowing is of a different order of thought. He notes there is a form of thought and philosophizing that denies the substance and authority of the Christian faith: “The content of this faith, however, is so indeterminate in itself that, while it will, to be sure, countenance that content in some way, it encompasses just as much the belief that the Dalai Lama, the bull, the monkey, and so forth, is God, and for its own part it restricts itself to the idea of a God in general, a supreme being.”[3] Dismissal of the primacy and specificity of revelation results in the God of Christianity being traded for an empty abstraction.
Though the world may appear as Other, and the individual in her thought may seem isolated from the world, thought stands behind the world and the bridge between subject and object, self and world, is in thinking (cognizing) God. Hegel argues for training in the faith, baptism, formation in the Church, and far from being an atheist or heterodox he considers himself an orthodox Christian.[4] “When the standpoint of immediate knowing admits that, for religious faith in particular, a development and a Christian or religious education are necessary, then it is mere arbitrariness to want to ignore this again when it comes to talking about believing.”[5]
Reconciliation with God, self, and creation, is not simply conceivable, but it is in the conceiving that reconciliation is accomplished. This overcoming of the gap between self and Other, or the negation of the seeming inherent alienation in the world (the negation of the negation) not only gets at the root of Hegel’s system but of Paul’s. Hegel is borrowing from Paul (deploying Luther’s translation of Paul’s κατήργηται in Romans) so as to describe this suspension of the negative (aufheben or Aufhebung).[6] Hegel was reacting to an Enlightenment understanding, much as Paul was reacting to a common Jewish understanding in which law, the world, or objects, are pictured as mediating God rather than God in thought and spirit as mediating the world. As Hegel puts it, “Now in the same way natural philosophizing, which holds itself to be too good for the concept and which through this deficiency takes itself to be an intuitive and poetical thinking, trades in the arbitrary combinations of an imagination which is quite simply disorganized by its own thoughts. . .”[7]
Hegel finds Kant’s philosophy an improvement (on Spinoza and Descartes) in its focus on the faculty of knowing, but the error is in trying to know about knowing before knowing. “To be sure, the forms of thought should not be employed unexamined, but examining them is already itself a process of knowing. Consequently, the activity of the forms of thought and their critique must be joined in knowing.”[8] There is a relinquishing of the possibility of knowing in Enlightenment thought, and in Hegel’s estimate this is its own kind of unbelief as thought is deemed inadequate. There is a simultaneous passage beyond Kant, which is actually to fall behind Kant into the metaphysics he critiqued.[9]
Hegel’s “concept,” he claims, preserves the Kantian critique while moving beyond it. “The concept in its speculative sense must be distinguished from what is customarily called a ‘concept’. It is only with reference to the latter one-sided sense of the term that it has been asserted again and again a thousand times and been made a prejudice that the infinite cannot be grasped by means of concepts.”[10] In Hegel’s definition, the concept is complete in itself: “The concept is the free [actuality] [das Freie], as the substantial power that is for itself, and it is the totality, since each of the moments is the whole that it is, and each is posited as an undivided unity with it. So, in its identity with itself, it is what is determinate in and for itself.”[11] There is an overcoming of subject and object through the concept (inclusive of a negation of negation), key to Hegel’s thought (derived from Paul).
Hegel’s negation of the negation extends Paul’s “suspension” of the law (Rom 7:2), in which knowing God in Christ is direct, and thus involves a denial of both Enlightenment antinomies and a Jewish understanding of God. This involves, both as Paul and Hegel describe it, a different experience of the self. Paul in Christ (Rom 8) is no long divided against himself as he was in his pre-Christian life (Rom 7:7ff). As Hegel describes (following Kant), the resolution pertains directly to experience of the I: “The I relates the manifold of sensing and intuiting to itself [the I] and unifies it [the manifold] within itself [the I] as one consciousness (pure apperception) and, as a result, this manifold is brought to an identity, into an original combination.”[12] Kant, in Hegel’s estimate has correctly articulated the issue, but Hegel’s point is that “it is not the subjective activity of self-consciousness that introduces absolute unity into the manifoldness. This identity is, rather, the absolute, the true itself.”[13] Kant’s philosophy is a subjective idealism, in that he does not incorporate objective experience into the subject, but Hegel maintains this unification in thought (the subjective) is not only true of the individual but of the world. “Now although the categories (such as, for example, unity, cause, and effect, and so forth) do belong to thinking as such, it does not follow at all from this that they should for that reason be ours alone, and not also determinations of the objects themselves. This, however, is supposed to be the case according to Kant’s outlook.”[14] Kant’s religion, like that of the Enlightenment, “contradicts the explicit command of the Christian religion to know God in spirit and in truth and . . . derives from a humility that is in no way Christian but instead conceited and fanatical.”[15] The ultimate conceit, according to Hegel is to refuse the knowledge of God offered in the Christian faith, while claiming to believe and follow this faith.
In Hegel’s estimate, this sort of thought is stuck in the finite realm: “If a fixed opposition attaches to the thought-determinations, i.e. if they are of a merely finite nature, then they are unfit for the truth that is absolutely in and for itself, and the truth cannot then enter into thinking.”[16] This finite thinking is split between the “subjective” and “objective.” “[D]ue to their limited content generally they persist in opposition to each other and even more so to the absolute.”[17] Science presumes that truth is available for and resides in “immediate consciousness” and so too “philosophical science” must begin with this fundamental acknowledgement, which Hegel calls the “simplest appearance of spirit.”[18]
The science of philosophy begins with the proclamation of a specific capacity for knowing God: “More precisely, the consoling quality of the Christian religion lies in the fact that, because God himself is known [gewußt] here as the absolute subjectivity. . .”[19] God is absolute Subject and it is knowing this reality that “our particularity is also by this means recognized, not merely as something that is to be abstractly denied, but at the same time as something to be preserved.”[20] Knowing God and being persons is not to be conceived as an abstract possibility but a lived reality, which is the very goal set before us in the Christian faith: “the Christian God is the God not merely known [gewußt] but the unqualifiedly self-knowing [sich wissende] God, and not merely imagined but instead an absolutely actual personality.”[21] God’s person encompasses all things and is the ground of human personhood and knowing.
Spirit, the concept, or knowing, in Hegel’s system, refuses traditional metaphysics – “an ontology focused on substances as with Aristotle and Descartes, or on the one substance as the sum total of reality that is both God and nature, as with Spinoza.”[22] Spinoza’s God, according to Hegel, left the human subject contemplating the world as an object. “Although substance could be endowed with thought or reason like Aristotle’s nous or Spinoza’s God, the thinking that contemplated this substance contemplated an object: something other than itself that is not a self for itself and therefore still separated from the contemplating subject.”[23] Hegel supposes that Spinoza’s problem is the Jewish problem, and so ”it must be admitted that the Spinozistic philosophy lagged behind the true concept of God, which forms the content of Christian consciousness.”[24] According to Hegel, Spinoza continues the assumption of Jews and Orientals in general that all finite things are “transient” and “vanishing.” This truth requires the further development of a Christian understanding that personhood or the individual is not subject to this vanishing transience.
He notes that Spinoza did not deserve the accusations of atheism, but terms his belief “acosmism, since according to this philosophy there is actually no world at all in the sense of something positively being [eines positiv Seienden].”[25] It is deeply ironic, that in denying the God of Spinoza and replacing him with the Father of Christ, Hegel is accused of atheism. In Hegel’s description, Spinoza is only guilty of what every Jew, Moslem, and Christian who regards “God merely as the unknowable, supreme, and other-worldly being” is guilty.[26] They are all semi-atheists in-as-much as they do not acknowledge the true Christian God. They are content with difference and antinomy, but according to Hegel this does not attain to Christian truth. They are finite thinkers, who make subject-object opposition the final form of thought, and they deny that God or ultimate reality or “the thing in itself” can be known.
Hegel presumes deism is the natural outcome of Enlightenment religion, and he juxtaposes this faith with Trinitarian orthodoxy: “the definition of God put forward by so-called deism, is the concept of God insofar as it is a mere concept of the understanding, while by contrast the Christian religion, knowing [wissen] God as the triune God, contains the rational concept of God.”[27] True reason is grounded in the orthodox faith passed on through the Church: “Christian faith includes within it the authority of the Church; by contrast, the faith of that philosophizing standpoint has only the authority of one’s own subjective revelation. Furthermore, that Christian faith is an objective content, rich in itself, a system of doctrine and knowledge.”[28] Hegel presumes he is building on a Christian orthodoxy largely abandoned.
Ironically, a post-Enlightenment world, very much like the Jewish world which Paul faced, so equated God with what is not God (the law, objective reality, the Other, or simply feeling and intuition) that knowing God directly in Christ involves denial of an empty category. God as the big Other (the transcendent Other), displaced by Christ, struck the Jews as blasphemy in the same way Hegel’s notion that God is cognizable is a denial of the God of the Enlightenment. The fact that Hegel is mostly read as heterodox or as an atheist points to a failure of thought; the failure to overcome the binaries of the Enlightenment (Kant’s “antinomies of the understanding”) and to embrace the full reality of Christian thought. As Hegel puts it, “God’s being is inseparably bound up with the representation of God in our consciousness.”[29] Conceptions of God must be immediately related to conception and thinking itself, as this is the “concrete” and unchanging foundation given in Christian faith. Knowing God in Christ through the spirit, is not isolated from knowledge in general but opens the world and ourselves to true knowledge.
[1] Goerg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline Part I: Science of Logic, Translated and Edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 [1817]) xi.
[2] Ibid, 113.
[3] Ibid, 113.
[4] Ibid, 117.
[5] Ibid, 117.
[6] G. W. F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 68.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Encyclopedia, 84.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid, 37. In Hegel’s description, contemporary philosophy is caught up in trying to describe the instruments of knowing, before it actually begins to know, but to know the instruments of knowing is already to deploy them: “the examination of knowing cannot take place other than by way of knowing” Ibid, 38. He likens it to trying to learn to swim without getting into the water. To want to know before knowing is the conundrum that never allows for a beginning.
[11] Ibid, 233.
[12] Ibid, 85.
[13] Ibid, 87.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid, 206-207.
[16] Ibid, 66.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid, 221.
[2o] Ibid.
[21] Ibid, xiv.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid, xiv.
[24] Ibid, 224.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid, 256.
[28] Ibid, 224.
[29] Ibid, 267. Here he is favoring Anselm (whom he will also fault) over Descartes and Spinoza.
